One might argue that there is some political value in forcing liberals to take a formal stand on the progress of a war they declare irredeemably lost in the spring and early summer of 2007. But since we don’t hold members of congress to account for anything they say, even that is an exercise in futility.

The resolution appears to be purely symbolic, but I will skim the language for anything substantive once it is introduced and keep my eyes peeled for any particularly interesting rhetoric.

Federal police check their guns as they get ready to board a plane to Juarez

Not specifically Petraeus-related, but perhaps indicative of the level of the surge’s success that it is now inspiring similar action in comparatively developed countries. The Mexican government is flooding the lawless border town of Juarez with thousands of federal cops and soldiers in an attempt to restore law and order in a town that has become synonymous with murder and drug crime.

It will be interesting to see if the comparison to the surge is widely drawn and how far that analogy can be stretched.

Thomas Ricks succinctly analyzes President Obama’s withdrawal plan:

Our participation in this war ends not when one president hangs a “Mission Accomplished” banner or when another president declares that combat has ended, but when American troops stop being killed there.

Ricks, I think, correctly identifies this announcement as one that doesn’t announce American intent to depart Iraq, but American intent to remain. Even if everything goes exactly as planned, there will be a large force of combat troops in Iraq probably as long as anyone reading this lives. And we have only a very short history of having things go as planned in Iraq.

Petraeus was involved in three-way talks between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Washington with Hillary Clinton. The three-day meeting, attended by the heads of the respective foreign affairs departments, laid the groundwork for regular meetings between the nations.

…there are several competing narratives that explain the surge. Team Odierno, Team Petraeus, and Team First Cav all have their different takes on what happened and who was responsible. There is also a narrative — promulgated in Bob Woodward’s books and elsewhere — that the surge was basically conceived in the White House. The Gamble whole-heartedly embraces the Team O narrative, giving [Raymond T.] Odierno not only credit for conceiving of the surge but also for its execution. 

Exum goes on to wonder why, given the amount of credit given to Raymond Odierno, the book’s subtitle instead mentions Petraeus and suggests it might be a marketing decision; the public is more familiar with Petreaus.

Other winners of the Ricks account according to Exum, are The West Point Social Science and History Departments (specifically a group of officers who taught in those departments and filled key military roles during the Surge time period, not the least of which of course, is Petraeus), President Bush, the American Enterprise Intitute and Jack Keane, the U.S. Army, and the “Foreigners” ( The British Emma Sky, Australian Dave Kilcullen and Palestinian Sadi Othman).

The book’s losers were the Army’s general officer corps, who are faulted for not being able to develop any successful Iraq strategy on their own, and in particular Colonel Gian Gentile, who is a leading challenger of the idea that Petraeus’ strategy is a responsible one,  and the British Army, whose counter insurgency successes early in the war ultimately disintegrated. Exum also identifies several curious ommisions from Ricks; brigade and battalion commanders who largely executed the surge, the National Security Council,  and the new media, specifically sites like Small Wars Journal and platoonleader.org and their effect on the junior officers fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

All this makes me anxious to get my hands on a copy of the book.